CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WASHINGTON, D. C.


25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF

- 1. In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 2 of the attached memorandum, it is suggested that the phrase "next of kin" may be interpreted to mean only the immediate family of the individual concerned. In the case of an American citizen married to a Polish girl, for example, such an interpretation would include her as a member of the immediate family, but would not include the members of her family who may still be living in Poland.
- 2. It is believed that the provision in question should cover the "next of kin" of both husband and wife and the following wording is recommended:
 - "3a. of excellent character who are native born citizens of the \overline{U} nited States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."

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22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Souers

SUBJECT:

Proposed Policy on Clearance of personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

INCLOSURE:

Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same subject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary, H.I.A., on 15 April)

- 1. Lat the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following questions were raised with reference to the enclosure:
- A. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive, or with the C.I.G.?
- b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of Central Intelligence?
- g. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make exceptions as he sees fit?
- sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, regardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of individuals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnishing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable length of time (90 to 120 days in the dase of War). Placing the responsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the departments would have the following effects:

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- A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be required.
 - . D. Security checks would be expedited.
- Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the ultimate responsibility resides in any case.
- 3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for investigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concurrence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to conduct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.
- A. With reference to 1-g, one viewpoint was that the Director should be authorised to grant exceptions without further concurrences and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in exceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified material from all departments.
- 5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-a of the proposed directive should be re-worded as follows:

of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a fereign power.

"SIGNED"

JAMES S. LAY, JR. Secretary, N.I.A.